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An automated air sampling station has recently been developed by Radiation and Nuclear Safety
Authority (STUK). The station is furnished with equipment that allows comprehensive remote moni-
toring of the station and the data. Under the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards, STUK
and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) established a field trial to demonstrate the use of remote
monitoring technologies. STUK provided means for real-time radiation monitoring and sample authen-
tication whereas SNL delivered means for authenticated surveillance of the equipment and its location.
The field trial showed that remote monitoring can be carried out using simple means although ad-
vanced facilities are needed for comprehensive surveillance. Authenticated measurement data could be
reliably transferred from the monitoring site to the headquarters without the presence of authorized
personnel in the monitoring site. The operation of the station and the remote monitoring system was
reliable.
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The purpose of the present field trial is to de-
monstrate the use of environmental air sampling
with remote data transmission for possible future
use of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). The objectives are to support the IAEA
goal of placing specific facilities under remote mo-
nitoring safeguards, to maintain or improve the
current level of safeguards reliability, to reduce
inspection costs to the IAEA, to reduce radiation
exposure to inspectors and to reduce intrusive-
ness to the facilities.
The trial is a joint effort between the Radiation
and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) and the
U.S. Department of Energy, which is represented
by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). STUK
developed an automated high-volume aerosol sam-
pling station for environmental radiation monitor-
ing (Toivonen et al. 1997). The station is located
on the roof of STUK headquarters, and was select-
ed to be the remote monitoring site because of its
infrastructure and accessibility. SNL developed
means for comprehensive remote surveillance of
the station. Sensors have been strategically placed
on the air sampling station and throughout the
room to provide knowledge about access to the
room, motion within the room and access to the
1 INTRODUCTION
equipment cabinet. The sensors send authenticat-
ed state-of-health data and alarms to a collection
unit, which then forwards this information, with
radiation data files produced by the station, to
authorized users at remote sites.
Plans for installations of remote monitoring
equipment were discussed between 1995 and au-
tumn 1997. The main installations for the auto-
mated air sampling station were performed in
1997 and finished in winter 1998. The first ver-
sion of remote monitoring data transmission was
available in autumn 1997. SNL’s remote monitor-
ing equipment was sent to STUK in January 1998
and the installation team visited STUK 10–18
February 1998. A test period of six months fin-
ished at the end of august 1998.
During the field trial authorized users were
able to remotely monitor the station itself, the
radiation data, the weather data and the data
produced by different sensors. This was demon-
strated in Vienna, March 1998, when a connection
between the IAEA and the STUK www server was
established. The data was accessed through inter-
net and direct modem connection. Normal opera-
tion of the station as well as artificial incidents
were demonstrated.
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STUK continuously monitors airborne radioactive
substances. The surveillance is performed using
manually operated air samplers (Fig. 1) located in
different parts of Finland. Samples are collected
into glassfibre filters which are mailed to STUK.
The filters are manually prepared suitable for
quantitative gamma-ray analysis. STUK reports
average concentrations periodically (Leppänen
and Niskala 1996). Average concentration of diffe-
rent nuclides (Bq m–3) is calculated from the acti-
vities of the filter (Bq), measured by a gamma-ray
spectrometer, and the volume of filtered air (m3).
Average concentrations are needed for estimating
the radiation hazards that airborne radioactive
substances may cause in an accident.
The manual samplers are often operated in a
way which does not easily allow monitoring of
their status during the sampling. The status can
2 AUTOMATED AIR SAMPLING STATION
Figure 1. The sampler used in continuous surveillance of airborne radioactive materials (left). The new
fully automated sampling station is located inside the building. The air inlet head and blower of the
automated station are outside. The detectors of the weather station are located on the top of the pole. The
automatic sampling station is in routine operational use; it replaces the present manual sampler.
Weather station
Air inlet head
Blower
Manually operated sampler
used in continuous surveillance
Room for automated
air sampling station
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be verified only on-site, not in the remote site (e.g.
in the headquarters of STUK). The measurement
data is available only after tedious sampling,
sample transportation, sample manipulation and
laboratory procedures.
A new fully automated air sampling station
has been developed in which air monitoring sur-
veillance is combined with remote monitoring
equipment (Toivonen et al. 1998). The station
filtrates radioactive substances from the air, mon-
itors radionuclides collected on the filter in real-
time, changes the filter and prepares it for on-site
high-resolution gamma-ray analysis. All of these
procedures are performed automatically. Further-
more, the station collects, stores, analyses and
presents radiation data, weather data and process
data which are integrated via the local network
(Fig. 2).
The detection sensitivity of Cinderella is supe-
rior compared with any other automated sampling
Figure 2. Automated air sampling station. The equipment consists of 1) air sampling unit, 2) sample
preparation unit, 3) real-time monitoring and alarm unit, 4) counting unit, 5) sample storage, 6) cabinet
for remote monitoring equipment and 7) aerosol authentication apparatus. The remote monitoring system
has a motion sensor (a), door sensors (b), air sampler door sensors (c), a video camera (d) and cabinet door
sensors (e). Computers are for real-time monitoring (A), process monitoring and HPGe data acquisition
and presentation (B), weather data measurements (C) and intranet/internet connections (D).
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and measuring equipment. The quality of the data
is as good as can be achieved in the best manual
systems with laboratory measurement.
2.1 Air sampling and filter
preparation
Sampling is fully automated. Once a week the ope-
rators of the station mount fresh filters into cas-
settes which are then loaded in the clean filter
storage (Fig. 3). In the mean time the station is
working in automatic mode. Before sampling the
cassettes are automatically moved into the filtra-
tion unit. In the cassette the filter is supported by
a metallic grid and a specially designed base. The
base consists of 15 circular holes, each with a dia-
meter of 77 mm, arranged in a 3 × 5 matrix
through which the air flows. Thus, the total area
for particle deposition is 700 cm2. The air flow rate
through the filter can be selected between 300 to
800 m3h–1.
After sampling, the filter cassettes are auto-
matically moved to the cassette storage. Filter
treatment is performed by a sample manipulator
(Fig. 4). The automatic process consists of filter
identification, filter cutting into 15 pieces and
their transfer into a plastic beaker, and beaker
transfer between the sample storage and the gam-
ma-ray spectrometer. Radiation background, pro-
duced by naturally occurring short-lived daugh-
ters of radon is reduced by decay between the end
of sampling and start of counting. The decay is
Figure 3. Details of the air sampler. Clean filter storage (A) contains up to 7 cassettes which are automat-
ically moved to the filtration unit (B) for sampling. 2 NaI scintillation detectors, located below the filter,
are for real-time activity monitoring and alarm. After sampling the filter is moved to the sample manip-
ulation table (C) in which the filter is cut in 15 pieces by a robot. The pieces are put in an empty beaker
located in the sample storage (D). Sample manipulator (E) performs filter cutting and transfers the pieces
into the beakers. After cutting, empty cassettes are moved to the cassette storage (F).
A
B
C
D
E
F
NaI
Air
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needed to reduce the background which would
hamper the detection of man-made radionuclides.
The automatic duty cycle of the station is 1 d
sampling, 1 d decay and 1 d measurement.
2.2 Monitoring of radioactive
materials on the filter
Real-time monitoring of the filter is intended for
alarm purposes but it also reveals the mode of
operation of the equipment. Filter changes, shut-
down of the station and abnormal radiation situa-
tions are easily traced.
Real-time activity monitoring of the filter is
performed with 2 NaI scintillation detectors locat-
ed below the filter (see Fig. 3). The energy range is
0−3 MeV in 256 channels and the resolution is
about 40 keV at 662 keV. The peak of 40K at 1460.8
keV is used for stabilizing the energy calibration
against drift caused by temperature changes. The
background shield is constructed of lead bricks
and reduces the background radiation coming
from directions other than the filter.
Special software, known as ACM, has been
designed to collect the data and to visualize the
spectra. The real-time software reads spectra in 1
min intervals from the multichannel analysers,
calculates time-dependent cumulative spectra
(sum of the counts) and saves the spectra to the
hard disk. Sum spectra for the periods of 10 min, 2
h and 1 d are calculated for both detectors. The
software is able to display the raw data in several
Figure 4. Sample manipulator (E). The cutting blade (see also Fig. 7) of the arm (E) moves in the x–y–z
direction. The control panel (G) for manual operation of the sampler and the HPGe detector are located
behind the sampling unit. The nozzle of the aerosol authentication apparatus is on the broadside of the air
inlet tube.
E
G
HPGe
Cutting blade
Authentication
nozzle
Air
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different views such as spectrum channel con-
tents, total count time series, region-of interest
count time series and color-coded spectrum time
series (Fig. 5). The images are saved on the disk
for intranet/internet access. The spectra are ana-
lysed in real time. An alarm signal is generated
should the total count rate exceed threshold limit
or an unusual shape of the spectra occurs.
2.3 Gamma-ray analysis of
the filter
Nuclide composition of radioactive materials on
the filter is analysed using a high-resolution gam-
ma-ray spectrometer after 1 d decay (Fig. 6). The
relative efficiency of the electrically cooled HPGe
detector is 100 %. The detector is placed in a cop-
per- and tin-lined lead shield. The diameter of the
detector is 89.8 mm and the height is 54.4 mm.
Thus, the counting geometry is near optimum sin-
ce the diameter of the active part of the samples is
77 mm and height of the stack of the filter pieces
is about 8 mm.
Energy, efficiency and peak shape calibrations
are checked before starting a new sample analy-
sis. A 10 min quality control measurement takes
place when the background cover shield is open
(Fig. 7). A calibration source, attached on the
surface of the cover, is then moved above the
detector. The source does not disturb the actual
sample measurement.
For various nuclides, minimum detectable con-
centrations (MDC) are typically 1−10 μBq m–3
(Toivonen et al. 1998). These limits are far better
than the CTBT requirement of 10–30 μBq m–3 for
140Ba. MDC is a function of 212Pb concentration:
MDC a bCPb= + ,
where CPb is the 
212Pb concentration, a = 16.57 and
b = 0.4649 for 140Ba (Fig. 8). The shape of the curve
Figure 5. “Waterfall” picture generated from NaI spectra. Each vertical line represents an individual
spectrum, color-coded according to the amount of pulses in the channels. Time is in the horizontal axis.
The present data was collected between 5 September 1998 03:00 to 8 September 1998 11:00, UTC. Elevated
radon background during the early morning hours of 6, 7 and 8 September is clearly visible.
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Figure 6. Part of a typical gamma-ray spectrum (channels 1–1000) from a sample collected between 27–
28 September 1998. The nuclide identification is based on suggestions performed by the Gamma-98 com-
puter code (Leppänen 1998). Before identification the peaks of the background are subtracted. Most of the
unidentified peaks refer to background nuclides. So far, the automated analysis is verified manually to
prevent false identification.
is a square root because only the constant backg-
round and the thoron progenies have an influence
on the baseline of the spectrum.
2.4 Sample authentication
A simple authentication system (Ylätalo et al.
1997) has been implemented in the sampling sta-
tion. An aerosol tag added to the filter during
sampling reveals possible tampering efforts. The
tag could be an invisible chemical dispersed onto
the filter at the end of the sampling sequence or it
could be another signature that can be detected
only by using special equipment. In the present
field trial, particles of known size, shape and com-
position are injected into the inlet tube of the
sampler. The particles are deposited on the filter
from which they can be detected using different
methods (Fig. 9). Tampering will be revealed in
subsequent laboratory analyses if the observations
do not match known characteristics of the par-
ticles.
2.5 Weather data
The automated sampling station is equipped with
a weather station which measures wind speed and
direction, air temperature and rain (see Fig. 1).
The temperature of room air, circulated through
the PVC tubes around the NaI detectors, is also
measured. Indoor temperature measurements are
useful state-of-health indicators.
12
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Figure 7. Sample transfer. The background cover shield of the HPGe detector is open and the cutting/
manipulation blade is taking a sample out of the detector. The calibration source is located on the surface
of the cover.
Figure 8. Mininimum detectable concentration (MDC) of 140Ba as a function of 212Pb concentration. Ra-
don progenies are decayed off and the energy of 7Be, 477 keV, is below the major peak of 140Ba, 537 keV. The
MDC calculation was performed for the baseline width of 2.5 FWHM.
Calibration
source
Sample
Arm ofthe  robot
Manipulation  and
cutting blade
Background
cover shield
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Figure 9. SEM-picture of a spherical tag particle on a glassfibre filter loaded by outdoor dust particles of
irregular shape. Here, the diameter of the tag particle is approximately 3 μm.
14
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3.1 Monitoring of measurement
data and state-of-health data
Monitoring the state-of-health and the environ-
ment of the air sampling station ensures that the
station is operating as designed and it is functio-
ning in an environment that allows proper air
sampling.
The station is equipped with indicators that
look after the sampling process and functioning of
the equipment. Indicators implemented into the
station are
• Air pressure in the sampling pipe
• Total volume of sampled air
• Current air flow rate
• ON/OFF-indication based on pressure infor-
mation
The data for circumstances of air inside and outsi-
de of the laboratory consists of
• Temperature inside the laboratory
• Temperature of air nearby NaI detectors
• Temperature of outside air
• Wind speed
• Wind direction
• Rain (ON/OFF)
Low-resolution gamma-ray spectrometry reveals
the mode of station operation. The on-line radiati-
on surveillance system contains
• NaI spectra measured with intervals of 1,10
and 120 min
• Gross gamma with the same intervals
• Ratio of Low/High energy region
The presence and internal consistency of natural
radioactive materials in the samples indicate that
air sampling has been performed, the sample is
fresh and the volume of filtrated air is of the right
order of magnitude. Remotely monitored HPGe
data consists of
• Spectra in a specified format
• Results of the spectrum analysis
• Picture of the spectra
• Quality assurance measurement data
The computer system of the automated station
consists of a computer for process data and HPGe
measurements. Separate computers are used for
NaI measurements, weather data and www servi-
ces (Fig. 10). The site collection unit in the SNL
cabinet also has a computer. STUK’s computers
are on a separate network, which is connected to
the STUK local area network and Internet via a
firewall computer. The computers share data with
each other by sharing disk resources of the net-
work. Secure ID cards authenticate the Internet
connections. The site collection unit performs data
communication via modems.
Results of the spectrum acquisition and proc-
ess data are available for authorized users
through a www server. Status of the operation of
the station and links to environmental and proc-
ess conditions, real-time activity monitoring and
gamma-ray analysis are visible in the home page
(Fig. 11). Figs. 5 and 6 as well as Fig. 11 are taken
directly from the screen of the computer and are
typical examples of the www pages.
Weather data, real-time activity monitoring
data, HPGe data and process data are periodically
updated to the database of the www server. The
size of one HPGe spectrum is 102 kB and two
spectra per day takes about 6 MB per month. The
5 pictures of one spectrum (channels 0–1000,
1000–2000, …, 6000–8192, see Fig. 6) on the www
server are 5 to 15 kB each (gif format) and need
3 REMOTE MONITORING OF THE AIR
SAMPLING STATION
The remote monitoring concept consists of surveillance of
the measurement data and state-of-health data as well as
monitoring the station itself.
S T U K - Y T O - T R 1 5 4
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Figure 10. Computer system of the automated air sampling station. The roof laboratory network and
STUK’s network as well as SNL’s cabinet are separated.
Figure 11. Home page of the report system for the automated air sampling station.
16
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about 1.4 MB per month. The NaI spectra are
produced at a rate of about 100 MB per month.
Thus, periodic compression of the spectra and
subsequent data archiving is needed. The process
data and the weather data take about 1 MB per
month. The total space needed for HTML pages is
about 10 MB per month without NaI spectra.
3.2 Monitoring of the station and
its location
SNL’s equipment continuously monitors the air
sampling station and the room where it is located.
This provides another means of assurance that
the air sampling is performed as intended and the
air samples are authentic. The monitoring concept
is to have knowledge of access to the room, motion
within the room, and access to the air sampling
station and the equipment cabinet. This is ac-
complished through the use of balanced magnetic
switches over the two doorways, a motion detector
within the room, a break beam, tamper-indicating
switches on the clean filter storage section and the
used cassette storage section of the air sampler,
and a video camera (see Fig. 2). The break beam is
installed near the air sampling station to detect
movement of the sample manipulator, which per-
forms the filter cutting and transfer of filter samp-
les to a beaker. The tamper-indicating switches on
the air sampler and the break beam trigger video
images when an alarm is detected. All of the sen-
sors communicate with the site collection unit via
a sensor network (Fig. 12). The unit forwards the
monitoring data and radiation files to authorized
users at remote sites.
Figure 12. Diagram of the remote monitoring system.
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SNL’s remote monitoring system architecture con-
sists of (Fig. 12):
• Site collection unit
which is located in the air sampling room and
collects, logs and stores sensor data received
from the sensor network. Video images are also
stored on the unit. They are transmitted from
the video system to the site collection unit over
a separate connection. Additionally, the unit
receives data files from the STUK PCs. These
files are forwarded to the remote review sta-
tions upon request. The site collection unit
connects to the STUK remote review station
and off-site review stations via a modem.
• Remote review station
which resides at the STUK facility and pro-
vides STUK personnel with the capability to
review sensor data and video images through
Sandia provided software, as well as review
the radiation analysis data through STUK pro-
vided software. This review station is a Win-
dows NT based PC provided by STUK. Addi-
tional remote review stations receive data via
dial-up telephone modems and reside outside
of the STUK facility, i.e. Sandia National Labo-
ratories.
• Sensor network
which provides a medium for sensor data col-
lection and sensor-to-sensor communication us-
ing a proven commercially accepted technology
standard for industry sensor, and control and
status applications. The network provides the
cable plant to enable authenticated communi-
cations between the sensor nodes and the net-
work server. Each sensor, the network server,
and the video system are connected through an
authenticated node. Sensors include a motion
detector, a break beam, balanced magnetic
switches, and tamper-indicating switches. The
video system receives event trigger informa-
tion from sensors on this network. The pro-
grammable network server, or data logger, is
the repository for sensor event data. Sensor
data is passed from the programmable network
server to the site collection unit and subse-
quently to the stations for remote review.
• Video System
whose key component is the digital camera
module (DCM-14). The DCM-14 is an image
capturing system housed in a self-contained
module that can interface to both European
and United States standard cameras. The im-
ages are digitized, and then compressed, au-
thenticated, and sent to the site collection unit.
The digital camera module can store approxi-
mately 500–600 images in a 10 Mbyte card. A
video enclosure houses the video node, the
digital camera module and the camera.
The video camera is located in the room with the
air sampling station, equipment cabinet (housing
the site collection unit, the cabinet node, the pro-
grammable network server and the power supply)
and the door in its field of view (Fig. 13). Trigger
signals are received from the sensors via the net-
work and image data is sent to the site collection
unit via a separate cable. Video trigger informati-
on is captured at the site collection unit for corre-
lation with sensor event data.
18
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Figure 13. A typical picture taken by the video camera during the installation of SNL’s equipment, i.e. 20
February 1998.
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4.1 Experiences with STUK’s
remote monitoring equipment
In general, the basic software and hardware com-
ponents operated very well during the field trial.
However, there are still some software and hard-
ware related issues that need to be improved in
the near future.
• Some of the original temperature probes were
too sensitive for the electromagnetic field. The
problem was overcome by replacing the probes.
• Remote data loading of the HPGe spectra is
difficult using FTP services (STUK firewall).
• Analyzer of the HPGe spectra went gradually
out of order. Counting was stopped randomly
and many spectra were lost until the fault was
located in the power unit of the analyzer. After
repair the analyzer worked as designed.
• Resolution of the HPGe spectrometer was
found to be very good. The energy calibration
drifted 5 to 6 channels during a half-year
operation. Because the analyzing software per-
forms an internal energy calibration, this
caused no problem until another analyzing
software was tested without internal energy
calibration. An adjustment of the energy cali-
bration was then made and a monthly check-
and-adjust routine was introduced.
• The power supply of the electrically cooled
HPGe detector is secured with an aggregate of
STUK headquarters. However, during the first
electricity outage the aggregate was not start-
ed. Fortunately it happened during a working
day and rapid operation of personnel prevented
warming of the detector. The cords were moved
from the aggregate outlets to those that were
not affected by the break. In the near future an
additional instrument will be implemented to
prevent restart of the cooling after long-lasting
outages.
• The spectrum analysis software works well,
though it needs minor practical improvements
in reporting and displaying the results. Com-
bined with the web pages it provides a valuable
tool for an expert, who can from any place
rapidly see if abnormal observations are made
or a further interactive analysis of a spectrum
is needed. The spectrum can then be download-
ed rapidly from the web page and analyzed on
the expert’s computer. The analysis software
also produces an alarm message to pagers and
GSM-phones when an abnormal nuclide is
identified, which further improves the useful-
ness of the daily sampling in operational air
surveillance.
4.2 Experiences with aerosol
authentication system
Because of limited space around the sampler, the
aerosol authentication apparatus was placed
about 1 m apart from the air inlet tube (only the
aerosol nozzle is visible in Figs. 3 and 4, not the
main apparatus). Therefore particle losses to the
inner surfaces of the hosing were studied. The
losses were found to be negligible. Using a mixing
unit that performs stirring of the tag suspension
twice a day eliminates particle settling in the tag
reservoir. Periodic stirring is needed more often
provided that particles > 5 µm in diameter are
used.
Aerosol authentication as well as the mixing
unit was turned off several times for testing and
maintenance. A few days pause caused considera-
ble deposition into the tubes. Pressurized air was
used for resuspending the particles. The piping
from pressurized air delivery to the tag atomizer
was temporarily connected to the output pipe of
the liquid, yielding a reverse flow to the reservoir
and, consequently, re-mixing of the tag suspen-
4 EXPERIENCES DURING THE FIELD TRIAL
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sion. Thus, an additional mixing system would be
necessary for long-lasting breaks. This could be
carried out using a separate valve that is control-
led by a timer.
4.3 Experiences with SNL’s
remote monitoring equipment
4.3.1 Image and event management
The software products by SNL are simple and easy
to use. Because STUK was doing some installa-
tions to the sampling system, a lot of images were
stored in a working day (up to 100–200 images).
In the normal operation (automated sampling and
sample preparation) some 5–7 pictures are gene-
rated daily. Additional images are taken when re-
loading and removing filter cassettes.
• When there are over 200 images stored in the
database, the queries to the database are rath-
er slow. Also, downloading of the large volume
of images is time consuming.
• The “real time monitoring” program located in
the computer of the site collection unit is diffi-
cult to use when the update option is on. The
data is updated once per 30 seconds and the
update will take some 15 seconds. The only
practical choice is to turn the update option off
during the review.
• Browsing the images is easy; however, the
naming convention is difficult to follow. There
is no information seen with the picture brows-
er, or which event has caused the picture to be
taken. This would be a very practical addition,
especially when trying to locate possible error
conditions.
• The quality of the images is rather low. It is
difficult to identify people seen in the pictures
(see Fig. 13). However, the images were not
necessarily designed for recognition, only for
providing assurance of possible tampering.
• All the images are not necessarily synchro-
nized with the events. An opening event of the
bin of the new cassettes may be taken a few
seconds prior to the opening (the camera takes
pictures without events; pictures are saved on
the basis of triggering signal of the sensors).
Thus, in the picture there is often only a
person walking towards the sampler. This
might be somewhat confusing when analyzing
the results.
• State-of-health reports from certain sensors
are not consistent in time. For instance, a
sensor will report state of health several times
within a few minutes, and then not again for
twenty minutes. The reports are continuous,
however.
The pictures are downloaded to the review works-
tation once per every two weeks. The downloading
software works quite smoothly. Opening the Data
& Image Review program takes an exceptionally
long time (1 min in 133 MHz Pentium). Additio-
nally, transfers to the remote review workstation
located at SNL take too long.
• If the date and time are not in US format, the
review is not working at all. This is due to the
problem when comparing the dates. This can
be overcome by setting a separate user account
for the user of the site collection unit, where
the date and time format are set to US.
• The resolution of the viewer is fixed to
800×600. When selecting 1024×768 display res-
olution the display might be cut to half (Win-
dows “feature” ?).
• Installation of the Data & Image Review pro-
gram into a Windows NT workstation is
straightforward. However, the default directo-
ry is c:\mims, which prohibits installation of
the database into a network.
• Analysis tools, such as calculating time since
last system failure and state-of-health inter-
vals, would be useful additions to the remote
review station.
Otherwise, the software products seem to work as
expected. The computer in the cabinet has been
booted a few times but this is not an unexpected
behavior of the typical data acquisition computer
running Windows NT.
4.3.2 Remote monitoring hardware
(camera and network)
The camera does not use the daylight saving flag.
The program that polls the images from the came-
ra does not synchronize the time of the camera
and the time of the site collection unit. The syn-
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cronization is working only if the time difference
is less than 4 minutes. Otherwise the only possibi-
lity for syncronization is to put a serial cable to
the camera (the camera container has to be
opened) and use special software. However, this
option was not used.
There were some problems just after setting up
the system in the laboratory. The camera took
images once every five minutes. This was caused
by the magnetic field of the sampler pump electri-
cal control unit (high power inverter). The prob-
lem was cured using more shielding and setting
up the grounding of the system more securely.
The basic introductory course was quite com-
prehensive but the introduction to managing the
network could have more emphasis. A more exten-
sive course might be of good practice. The data-
base operations and user training were very well
set up.
4.4 Demonstration of the remote
monitoring system
In March 1998, SNL and STUK demonstrated the
remote monitoring system to the IAEA in Vienna.
Normal operations as well as abnormal situations
were demonstrated. During the day of performan-
ce no extra activities, such as unnecessary motion,
were allowed in the roof laboratory. However, it
was agreed that at a non-scheduled time an intru-
der would enter the room and tamper with the air
sampler and radiation detectors. The intruder
mounted a low-active 60Co source near the NaI
detectors for a short period (STUK personnel in
Vienna did not know this).
A connection was established between the
IAEA and the STUK www server. An overview of
the environmental monitoring system and www
pages was given. Process data, meteorological
data and spectrum data were reviewed via www
pages. During the presentation it turned out that
the NaI detectors discovered abnormal radiation
levels. The time of the exposure was visible in the
NaI spectra and 60Co was identified.
Additional information was detected by SNL’s
remote monitoring system. The door to the air
sampler room was opened, motion was detected
and an image was taken as the result of someone
opening the clean filter storage of the air sampler.
The image taken at the time the radiation level
went up proved that indeed someone tried to
influence the air sampler. Thus, the remote moni-
toring system succeeded to reveal tampering ef-
forts. Authenticated data was reliably transferred
to the remote site without the presence of person-
nel in the monitoring site.
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The field trial was a unique safeguards applicati-
on. Integration of remote monitoring equipment
with the STUK radiation monitoring system was a
challenging task. Efficient data transfer is a fun-
damental requirement of remote monitoring.
The field trial showed that part of the remote
monitoring could be carried out using simple
means. However, advanced facilities are needed
for comprehensive surveillance. The field trial
demonstration proved that authenticated meas-
urement data could be reliably transferred from
the monitoring site to the headquarters without
the presence of authorized personnel in the moni-
toring site.
In general, the remote monitoring equipment
functioned very well although minor reversals
occurred during the trial. Useful experience was
obtained. The major problems were related to the
amount of data to be transmitted via slow modem
links and the slow response of the review soft-
ware. However, a comprehensive vulnerability as-
sessment of the whole system was not possible
within the frames of the present IAEA safeguards
support programme.
The field trial utilized data transfer through
telephone lines. The volume of data, however, is so
large that this concept is not adequate in all
operational systems. In the future, other alterna-
tives should be considered. Internet would provide
a cheap transfer channel for those sites where
infrastructure exists. Data encryption and au-
thentication are of course required. Dedicated
satellite links are the best solution but the costs
may be large. The data transfer concept of the
CTBTO, based on VSAT (Very Small Aperture
Terminal), is excellent and would be valuable for
the safeguards application as well.
The present air monitoring system cannot be
directly applied to other surveillance programmes.
The equipment and the monitoring concept as a
whole must be tailored separately in each case.
However, the experience is very important when
applying remote monitoring at other sites using
different monitoring equipment. The field trial
showed that it is possible to construct a fully
automated air sampling station that can be oper-
ated unattended, including full protection and
monitoring of the sample and the data.
5 DISCUSSION
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